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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the order of summary
judgment in favor of the Sandy City Board of Adjustment was entered December 21,
2000. 2000 UT App 371 [reproduced in Addendum as Exhibit "A"] The Utah
Supreme Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this case by Order dated
June 28, 2001 and has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2-2(5) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The issue presented for review is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
adopted the rule in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) to
govern determination of issues where the law has changed but a party fails to appeal
Standard of Review: When exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah
Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals not of the trial court.
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997).

When reviewing

questions of law, the Utah Supreme Court accords no particular deference to the
conclusions of law made by the court of appeals but reviews them for correctness.
Allen v. Utah Deft of Health, 850 P.2d 1267,1269 (Utah 1993).
CONTROLLING LEGAL PROVISIONS
None. This case involves the interpretation of case law.

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
This case involves an action by John Collins and June Collins against the
Sandy City Board of Adjustment and Sandy City Corporation for review of a decision
by the Sandy City Board of Adjustment denying non-conforming use status for
certain real properties located in Sandy City owned by John and June Collins that had
been utilized as short-term rentals prior to the enactment by Sandy City of an
ordinance prohibiting such short-term rentals.
On October 27, 1998 the Petitioners John and June Collins filed an
application for non-conforming use status with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment.
This application was denied on November 12, 1998. The Petitioners filed a Petition
for Review on December 11, 1998. (R. 1-6) Cross motions for summary judgment
were subsequently filed (R. 15-16; 140-141) and the Motions were argued on August
16,1999. (R. 431)
The District Court granted the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denied the Petitioners' Motion. (R. 446-448; Add. 1-3 ) Petitioners filed this
appeal on December 16, 1999. (R. 449-450 ). On December 21, 2000 the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment of the District Court. [2000 UT
App. 371]. The Utah Supreme Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari by
Order dated June 28, 2001.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioners are the owners of certain real properties located within the
boundaries of Sandy City. For a lengthy period of time prior to March, 1996, the
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Petitioners utilized the properties as short-term rental properties, sometimes referred
to as "ski rentals". In March, 1996 the respondent Sandy City Corporation issued a
cease and desist order requiring the petitioners to cease using the properties for that
purpose.

(R. 28 ) Sandy City did not at that time pass an ordinance prohibiting

short-term rentals but relied instead on the existing ordinance, arguing that such use
was already prohibited.
The Petitioners filed an appeal to the respondent Sandy City Board of
Adjustment in 1996, which upheld Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy zoning
ordinances to preclude such use by the petitioners. Petitioners appealed that decision
to the Third District Court and the District Court upheld the decision of the Sandy
City Board of Adjustment. The Revised Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal
was signed November 17, 1997 and dated September 29, 1997. [Third District Court
Case No. 960905929CV] (R. 210 )
On March 26, 1998 the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision in a case
involving precisely the same issues as those presented by the Petitioners herein in the
above-referenced 1996 case which was pending at the same time as the petitioners'
1996 case, in Brown, et al vs. Sandy City Board of Adjustment; and Sandy, a political
subdivision of Utah, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) That case, decided March 26,
1998, held that Sandy City's interpretation of the Sandy City Development Code to
prohibit leases of less than thirty days in residential zones was not a correct
interpretation, i.e.,-Sandy City had no valid ordinance prohibiting short-term leases in
Sandy City. The respondent Sandy City then imposed a temporary moratorium on
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short-term rentals, allegedly effective March 27, 1998, and subsequently enacted
ordinances prohibiting short-term leases. (R. 36-45)
On or about October 27, 1998, the petitioners filed an application for
determination of non-conforming status on their properties with the Sandy City
Board of Adjustment

(R. 50)

That application was heard by the Board on

November 12, 1998. The Sandy City Board of Adjustment denied the petitioners'
application for determination of non-conforming use status on the petitioners'
properties, apparently relying on the 1996 District Court decision which denied the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by John and June Collins and granted the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sandy City Corporation.

(R. 446-448)

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of that decision in Case No. 980912601 in the
Third District Court. On cross motions for summary judgment the District Court
ruled that because the Petitioners/Appellants had not appealed the prior order in
Third District Court Case No. 960905929CV, that case was res judicata in the present
case (Case No. 980912601) and precluded the Petitioners/Appellants from obtaining
non-conforming use status on the subject properties.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding
that because the Appellants, John Collins and June Collins, chose not to pursue an
appeal of the 1996 District Court decision, they could not benefit from the change of
law exception to res judicata where, had they chosen to appeal, the change of law
would have been obtained. [2000 UT App. 371]

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in its holding that the intervening change in
the law in this case did not operate as a defense to Sandy City's claim that the 1998
suit filed by Mr. and Mrs. Collins was barred under principles of resjudicata by the
Summary Judgment entered in the 1996 suit between the same parties.
Barring the Petitioners from proceeding in the 1998 suit does nothing to
further the traditional purposes of issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Applying res
judicata as a bar in this case only perpetuates an erroneous ruling without valid
reasons.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

T H E COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY
ADOPTED T H E RULE IN FEDERATED
DEPARTMENT STORES v. MOITIE TO GOVERN
DETERMINATION OF ISSUES WHERE T H E
INTERVENING LAW HAS CHANGED BUT A PARTY
FAILS TO APPEAL.

The Court of Appeals ruled in this case that in a situation where one party in
cases litigating the same legal issue chooses not to pursue an appeal, that party may
not benefit from the change of law exception to res judicata where had that party
chosen to appeal the change of law would have been obtained. 2000 UT App 371, 16
P. 3d 1251, 1256 (Utah App. 2000) In so holding, the Utah Court of Appeals failed
to properly apply additional principles recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as
necessary in cases where issue preclusion is in dispute. The case of Norman v. Murray
First Thrift <& Loan Co., 596 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1979)
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requires the lower court, in

examining the issue of whether principles of res judicata should constitute a bar to
this action, to further inquire as to whether the controlling facts or legal principles
have changed significantly since the prior judgment. In that case the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
"To determine whether it is appropriate to apply collateral estoppel
necessitates three further inquiries: First, whether the issues presented
in the current litigation are in substance the same as resolved in the
prior litigation; second, whether the controlling facts or legalprinciples have
changed significantly since the priorjudgment [emphasis added]; third,

whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal
rules of preclusion." At 1032.
The Utah Court of Appeals in the instant case agreed that it is the general rule
that a subsequent change in the operative facts or the controlling law has generally
relieved a party from the application of res judicata, and further agreed that, in the
instant case, the law had changed since the 1996 suit. Collins v. Sandy City Board of
Adjustment, 16 P. 3d 1251, 1254 (Utah App. 2000). The Utah Court of Appeals
declined to apply the general rule in this case, relying on the case of Federated
Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981).
The Court of Appeals asserts that Moitie, supra, is a case strikingly similar to
the case Mr. and Mrs. Collins have brought. If one examines the facts in each case,
however, the instant case bears little resemblance to the situation presented in Moitie.
In the Moitie case, the change in the law that occurred was entirely unanticipated,
whereas in this case, Brown, supra, was a fully prepared appeal pending before the
Court of Appeals when the Collins' 1996 District Court decision was rendered. It
made no sense to file an appeal when a fully briefed appeal was already pending.

7

Judicial economy would dictate that Mr. and Mrs. Collins simply await the outcome in
Brown.
Unlike the petitioners in Moitie, Mr. and Mrs. Collins were not forum shopping
and they were not trying to mount a collateral attack.. Further, unlike the Moitie case,
the Petitioners in this case were not originally parties to the action that resulted in the
Brown decision.
Since Brown ruled there was no ordinance in Sandy City prohibiting short-term
rentals, Brown also essentially established that it was legal for everyone, including Mr.
and Mrs. Collins, to rent, or to have rented, residential property7 in Sandy for the shortterm. Sandy City, having been a party to the Brown case as well as the case with Mr.
and Mrs. Collins, was collaterally estopped, by virtue of Brown, from asserting that it
had a valid ordinance prohibiting short-term leases as against any property owner in
Sandy City, prior to the enactment of a valid ordinance. Hill vs. Seattle First Nat. Bank,
827 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1992)
The additional inquiry set forth in Norman v. Murray First Thrift <& ljoan Co.,
supra, should govern in this case. The facts in the instant case are not similar to the
facts in Moitie. The instant case was not a complex, multi-party suit involving
questions of federal and state law. While Moitie is controlling case law in the federal
court system, Moitie did not overrule Norman and there are valid reasons for applying
the analysis set forth in Norman to the facts in the instant case.
The Brown decision essentially stated that Sandy City had no ordinance in
effect that would prohibit any property owner in Sandy City from leasing their
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property short term. Every property owner utilizing his property for that purpose
prior to the enactment of a valid ordinance prohibiting such use would be eligible for
"grandfathering" under the non-conforming use ordinance. However, in the instant
case, the Petitioners John and June Collins are foreclosed from benefiting from the
holding in Brown because they did not appeal a District Court ruling that was
overruled by Brown. This is manifestly unjust and unfair. In the concurring opinion
in Moitie, supra, Justice Blackmun wrote:
"First, I, for one, would not close the door upon the possibility
that there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must
give way to what the Court of Appeals referred to as 'overriding
concerns of public policy and simple justice.5 Professor Moore
has noted: 'Just as res judicata is occasionally qualified by an
overriding, competing principle of public policy, so occasionally it
needs an equitable tempering.' " [citation omitted] 452 U.S. 394, 403.
Likewise, in the case of Reed v. Allen, cited in Moitie, Justice Cardozo wrote, in dissent,
concerning the application of the doctrine of res judicata, "A system of procedure is
perverted from its" proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without
the warrant of clear necessity." 286 U.S. 191, 209 (1932).
The instant case is a case where the doctrine of res judicata needs an equitable
tempering. John and June Collins are essentially being penalized for pursuing their
legal remedy. They cannot benefit from the holding in Brown but any other property
owner wTho did not pursue a legal remedy prior to Brown can benefit. This is an unfair
and unjust result, and it serves no valid, judicial purpose.

Such a result simply

perpetuates the trial court's erroneous ruling in the 1996 case. Appellate courts of
other jurisdictions have declined to apply res judicata as a bar in these circumstances.
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In the case of Cassidy v. Board of Education, 557 A.2d 227 (Md. 1989), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland considered the issue of whether a plaintiff could sue the Board
of Education even though her prior suit was dismissed for failure to allege notice to
the Board. An intervening appellate court decision had ruled that educational boards
were not municipal organizations and thus were not subject to the notice provision in
question. IdL at 233. The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that continuing to apply
the notice statute in that case would compel Cassidy to meet a standard no other
plaintiff needed to meet and would provide the Board with a windfall by way of a
mistake which could still be corrected. I d at 234. That Court, citing the Restatement
(Second) §28(2), held that "where there has been an intervening change in the applicable
legal context, an issue of law may be relitigated to avoid an inequitable administration
of the laws."

Id.

The Maryland Court of Appeals further stated that, "Our

conclusion that issue preclusion does not apply here is consistent with the rule's
traditional purpose. The rule 'is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters
which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually
and legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have become
obsolete or erroneous with time.' . . . " [citation omitted] Cassidy v. Board of Education,
557 A. 2d 227, 234 (Md. 1989).
Other state courts have likewise held that res judicata and its related doctrines
are flexible, not absolute, and should give way in extraordinary circumstances such as
a change in law. See, e.g., Snyder v. Newcomb Oil Co., Inc., 603 N.Y.S. 2d 1010 (A.D. 4
Dept. 1993); Foley v. Roche, 447 N.Y.S. 2d 528 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1982). This is consistent
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with the general rule that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions
operate retrospectively because they theoretically reflect interpretations of laws as
they always should have been. United States vs. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79
(1982).
In the case at bar, applying issue preclusion as a bar to the 1998 suit by Mr.
and Mrs. Collins does nothing to further the traditional purpose of the rule barring
relitigation of issues between the same parties. On the contrary, it gives Sandy City
the right to perpetuate an erroneous ruling as to one property owner while it is
precluded from applying that ruling to every other property owner, similarly situated,
in its jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The intervening change in the law effected by Brown, et. al v. Sandy City Board of
Adjustment, 957 P. 2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) established that the ruling of the District
Court in the 1996 case filed by John Collins and June Collins against Sandy City was
erroneous and it is therefore inappropriate to apply issue preclusion in this case under
the principles enunciated by this Court in Norman v. Murray First Thrift <& luoan
Company, supra. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed that Norman correctly stated the
law that a subsequent change in the controlling law generally relieves a party from the
application of res judicata. The Court of Appeals also agreed that there had been a
change in the law in this case. Applying issue preclusion in this case does nothing to
further the traditional purpose of that rule. It would only serve to perpetuate an error
and achieves an inequitable and unjust result in the context of this case.
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This Court should apply the principles enunciated in Norman v. Murray First
Thrift & Loan Co., supra, reversing the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals based
upon the intervening change in law brought about by Brown, et. al. v. Sandy City Board
oj Adjustment, supra.

This would be consistent with the general rule that judicial

decisions be applied retrospectively to reflect an interpretation of the law as it should
have been.
Dated this

day of November, 2001.
Respectfully submitted,

Franklin L. Slaugh
Attorney for Petitioners-Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant were mailed, first class postage prepaid, this
to the following:
Steven C. Osborn
Sandy City Attorney
10000 Centennial Parkway
Sandy, UT 84070
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BILLINGS, Judge:
Kl
John and June Collins (Collins) appeal from summary judgment
in favor of the Sandy City Board of Adjustment (Board). We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
%2 The Collins own certain real properties located in R-l-8
residential zones in Sandy City.1 The Collins claim they used
the properties as short-term rentals (rentals of less than thirty
days) until March 26, 1996 when Sandy City ordered them to cease
such use. Sandy City claimed their use was in violation of a

1. The properties at issue on appeal include those located at
1875 East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South, and 9255 Maison
Drive. The property located at 1456 East Longdale Drive was not
part of the trial court's order and therefore is not properly
before this court on appeal.

zoning ordinance which the City claimed prohibited short-term
rentals.
%3 The Collins appealed the cease and desist order to the
Board. The Board upheld the City's interpretation of the
ordinance. The Collins appealed the decision of the Board to the
third district court, which affirmed the Board's decision.
1|4
The Collins did not appeal the district court's decision.
Rather, they chose to await the outcome of Brown et al. v. Sandy
City Board of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
which involved the same issue of whether the Sandy City Land
Development Code prohibited short-term rentals in R-l-8 and R-l10 residential zones as the Board and district court had
concluded. See id. at 212. In Brown, this court held that
"short-term leases of residential properties are not prohibited
by the zoning ordinance," and thus invalidated the City's
interpretation of the ordinance.2 Id. In response to Brown,
Sandy City placed a moratorium on all short-term rentals,
effective March 27, 1998, see Sandy City, Utah, Ordinance No. 9819, and thereafter, on September 1, 1998, amended the ordinance
specifically prohibiting short-term leases. See Sandy City,
Utah, Ordinance No. 98-35.
1|5
On October 27, 1998, the Collins filed an application with
the Board seeking nonconforming use status on their properties.
The Board denied the application because the Collins did not
establish that they were using the properties as short-term
rentals on March 27, 1998, the effective date of the moratorium.
%6 The Collins appealed the Board's decision to the trial
court. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court
entered summary judgment for the Board on all properties. The
trial court held that the Collins* claim was barred on the
grounds of res judicata because the Collins failed to appeal the
1996 trial court decision. Additionally, the trial court found
that the properties did not qualify for nonconforming use status
because the Collins had failed to produce evidence to show that
they were using their properties as short-term rentals on March
27, 1998, and that the Collins had failed to produce evidence to
show that their use of the properties was in conformity with the
applicable zoning ordinances. The Collins appeal.

2. It is undisputed that, had the Collins appealed, they would
also have obtained this result.

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1|7
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "We
review a grant of summary judgment for correctness." Baczuk v.
Salt Lake Rea'l Med. Ctr., 2000 UT App 225,115, 8 P.3d 1037
(citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
ij8
The doctrine of res judicata comprises two different
branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Issue preclusion is
before us in this appeal. Issue preclusion, often referred to as
collateral estoppel, prevents relitigation of issues already
determined in a previous action. See id. at 250. Issue
preclusion applies if four requirements are met:
First, the issue in both cases must be
identical. Second, the judgment must be
final with respect to that issue. Third, the
issue must have been fully, fairly, and
competently litigated in the first action.
Fourth, the party who is precluded from
litigating the issue must be either a party
to the first action or a privy of a party.
Id. "If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there
can be no issue preclusion." Hill v. Seattle First Nat'1 Bank,
827 P.2d 241, 245 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).
f9
The Collins concede that three of the four requirements of
issue preclusion are met but argue that the issues in the 1996
case and this case are not identical. The Collins argue that in
the 1996 action the issue was whether the current Sandy City
ordinances prohibited leases of dwellings for terms of less than
thirty days. In this action, they argue that the issue presented
is whether they are entitled to a nonconforming use status
because of their use prior to the 1998 ordinance.
KlO The Board responds that the central issue in the 1996 action
was whether short-term rentals were lawful. The Board asserts
that the legality of short-term rentals is also central to the
Collins1 claim for nonconforming use status because to qualify
for a nonconforming use the applicant must show that the use was
legally established and continued before the enactment or
effective date of the restrictive legislation. See Sandy City,
Utah, Rev. Dev. Code § 15-24-2.

991068-CA

3

Ull In support of its position, the Board cites Robertson v.
Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983) . In Robertson, the issue was
whether a finding of undue influence in the execution of a will
collaterally estopped relitigation of the issue of undue
influence as to a trust. See id. at 1230-31. The defendant
argued that collateral estoppel was not applicable because the
issue tried and resolved in the first case, the validity of a
will, was different than that in the second, the validity of a
trust. See id. at 1230.
Hl2 The court stated that "[w]hat is critical is whether the
issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was essential
to resolution of that suit and is the same factual issue as that
raised in the second suit." Id. (citing Searle Bros, v. Searle,
588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978)). The court held that relitigation
of the issue of undue influence was collaterally estopped because
the validity or invalidity of the will was a legal conclusion
based on the factual finding of undue influence. See id.
fl3

The court reasoned that:
,f

[I]t is not the identity of the thing sued
for, or of the cause of action, which
determines the conclusiveness of a former
judgment upon a subsequent action, but merely
the identity of the issue involved in the two
suits. If an issue presented in a subsequent
suit between the same parties or their
privies is shown to have been determined in a
former one, the question is res judicata [or
collateral estoppel], although the actions
are based on different grounds, or tried on
different theories, or are instituted for
different purposes and seek different
relief."
Id. (quoting Pickeral v. Federal Land Bank, 15 S.E.2d 82, 85
(1941)) (alterations in original).
Hl4 We conclude Robertson defeats the Collins' claim that
because the actions are based on different legal groundslegality of short-term rentals versus noncomforming use--they are
not identical issues. Because the central issue in the 1996
action was the legality of the short-term rentals under the
ordinance, and in this suit we must determine that the pre-1996
use was lawful in order to establish a valid nonconforming use,
the same issue is involved.
Hl5 The Collins next argue that, regardless of whether the
issues in the 1996 suit and this suit are identical, because of
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an intervening change in the law, they should not be barred under
the principles of res judicata.
1(16 The Collins cite dicta from Norman v. Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that in
addition to the four requirements of issue preclusion, the court
must further inquire as to "whether the controlling facts or
legal principles have changed significantly since the prior
judgment." Id. at 1032. This statement of dicta has never been
cited in subsequent Utah case law. Nonetheless, we agree that it
is the general rule that a subsequent change in the operative
facts or the controlling law has generally relieved a party from
the application of res judicata. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162, 65 S. Ct. 573, 576

(1945);

Community Hosp. v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1993);
Muchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1962); Wagner
v. Baron, 64 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1953); Statler v. Catalano,
691 N.E.2d 384, 386-87 (111. Ct. App. 1997); Blevins v. Johnson,
344 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky. 1961); Farrow v. Brown, 873 S.W.2d 918,
920-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v. J.P. Lamb Land Co., 401
N.W.2d 713, 718 (N.D. 1987); Marino v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990).
i|l7 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324
U.S. 154, 65 S. Ct. 573 (1945), the Supreme Court stated that "it
is . . . the general rule that res judicata is no defense where
between the time of the first judgment and the second there has
been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an
altered situation." Id. at 162, 65 S. Ct. at 576.
Ul8 An illustrative case is Statler v. Catalano, 691 N.E.2d 384
(111. Ct. App. 1997). Statler dealt with a dispute over the
rights to the surface waters of a lake. See id. at 385. The
court determined that, under the prevailing case law, the
plaintiffs only had a right to use a portion of the lake rather
than the whole. See id. Seven years later, the plaintiffs filed
suit again seeking a declaration of their right to use the entire
lake. See id. The defendant moved to dismiss under the doctrine
of res judicata. See id. The trial court denied the motion,
finding that a subsequent change in the case law rendered res
judicata inapplicable. See id. at 385-86.
Hl9 In affirming the trial court, the Illinois Court of Appeals
reasoned that
[e]ven though the basic facts have not
changed, it is generally accepted that [r]es
judicata does not operate as an automatic bar
where between the time of the first judgment
and the second there has been an intervening
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decision or a change in the law creating an
altered situation.
Id. at 386-87 (citation omitted).
H20 In the instant case, the interpretation of the ordinance the
Board relied on, and which the district court held barred the
Collins from using their properties as short-term rentals in the
original 1996 action, was invalidated in Brown. Brown clearly
held the ordinance in question did not bar short-term rentals.
See Brown, 957 P.2d at 212. Thus the law has changed since the
1996 suit.
1|21 The Board responds claiming that res judicata is not
defeated by a subsequent change in the law when a party elects to
forgo an opportunity to appeal the first adverse judgment, and
stands by while others with the same legal claim pursue appeals
which result in the change in the law.
K22 The Board relies on Federated Department Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981), a case strikingly
similar to the one before us. In Moitie, seven civil class
actions were brought against owners of various department stores
alleging violation of federal antitrust law. See id. at 395, 101
S. Ct. at 2426. The district court dismissed all of the actions
in their entirety concluding that the purchasers had not alleged
an "injury" to their "business or property" within the meaning of
the Clayton Act. See id. at 396, 101 S. Ct. at 2426.
Plaintiffs in five of the suits appealed the judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit while two of
the plaintiffs did not, choosing instead to re-file their claims
in state court. See id. at 395, 101 S. Ct. at 2427.
H23 After removal of the state claims to federal court, the
federal district court concluded that the claims were essentially
the same as those decided in the original federal action and
dismissed them under the doctrine of res judicata. See id. at
397, 101 S. Ct. at 2427. Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court in an unrelated case held that retail purchasers can suffer
an "injury" to their "business or property" under the Clayton
Act. See id. Based on this decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded the five class actions that had been appealed and
were before the court. See id. When the two other cases came
before the Ninth Circuit, the court again reversed, refusing to
apply res judicata, reasoning that "non-appealing parties may
benefit from a reversal when their position is closely interwoven
with that of appealing parties." Id. at 398, 101 S. Ct. at 2427
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court reversed.

6

H24

The Court reasoned that
an "erroneous conclusion" reached by the
court in the first suit does not deprive the
defendants in the second action "of their
right to rely upon the plea of res judicata.
. . . A judgment merely voidable because
based upon an erroneous view of the law is
not open to collateral attack, but can be
corrected only by a direct review and not by
bringing another action upon the same cause
[of action] ." We have observed that " [the]
indulgence of a contrary view would result in
creating elements of uncertainty and
confusion and in undermining the conclusive
character of judgments, consequences which it
was the very purpose of the doctrine of res
judicata to avert."

Id. at 398-99, 101 S. Ct. at 2448 (quoting Reed v. Allen. 286
U.S. 191, 201, 52 S. Ct. 532, 534 (1932)) (alterations in
original). The Court also noted that the "respondents here made
a calculated choice to forgo their appeals," id. at 400-01, 101
S. Ct. at 2429, and that
11

[t]he predicament in which respondent finds
himself is of his own making. . . . [We]
cannot be expected, for his sole relief, to
upset the general and well-established
doctrine of res judicata, conceived in the
light of the maxim that the interest of the
state requires that there be an end to
litigation--a maxim which comports with
common sense as well as public policy."
Id. at 401-02, 101 S. Ct. at 2429 (quoting Reed. 286 U.S. at 19899, 52 S. Ct. at 533) (alterations in original). This language
is similar to that used by the Court in Ackermann v. United
States. 340 U.S. 193, 71 S. Ct. 209 (1950), which stated that
"[p]etitioner made a considered choice not to appeal. . . [h]is
choice was a risk, but calculated and deliberate and such as
follows a free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a
choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his
decision not to appeal was probably wrong. . . . There must be
an end to the litigation someday, and free, calculated,
deliberate choices are not to be relieved from." Id. at 198, 71
S. Ct. at 211-12.
1125 The case before us presents virtually the same factual
situation as was presented in Moitie. The Collins deliberately
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chose to forgo their appeal, instead choosing to rely on the
outcome of the appeal of the same legal issue in Brown. The
Collins now seek to be relieved from their "considered choice not
to appeal," and to benefit from the change in the law which they
could have obtained but which they chose not to pursue.3
i|26 This refusal to allow a non-appealing party to benefit from
the normal change of law exception to collateral estoppel has
also been recognized by our sister state courts. See Gail v.
Western Convenience Stores, 434 N.W.2d 862, 863 (Iowa 1989)
(stating "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed
judgment on the merits are not altered by the fact that the
judgment may have been wrong or rested on legal principles later
overruled in another case"); Ellis v. Whittaker, 709 P.2d 991,
994 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to vacate judgment on basis of
subsequent decision changing law because of failure to appeal
judgment); Cleveland v. Ohio Pep't of Mental Health, 618 N.E.2d
244, 247-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that failure to appeal
judgment bars collateral attack even if judgment is based on
erroneous view of law); see also Jachim v. Townsley, 619 N.E.2d
1317, 1319 (111. Ct. App. 1993); Whenery v. Whenery, 652 P.2d
1188, 1192 (N.M. 1982); In re Marriage of Vinson, 644 P.2d 635,
638 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) .
^[27 Although Utah's courts have not specifically dealt with a
Moitie res judicata situation, the Utah Supreme Court in
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah
1981), cited Moitie for the proposition that a final order,
"unless reversed on appeal, is res judicata and binding." Id. at
3. The Collins quote language from Arizona v. California, 460
U.S. 605, 103 S. Ct. 1382 (1983), in an attempt to bolster their
argument that a subsequent change of law bars application of res
judicata. Arizona v. California involved a dispute over water
rights between several western states and Indian tribes. See id.
One of the issues before the Court was whether to modify a prior
adjudication and decree involving water rights within reservation
boundaries. See id. at 615-16, 103 S. Ct. at 1389.
In Arizona, the Court stated that res judicata did not apply
because there was a provision in the decree that allowed the
Court to retain jurisdiction and modify, amend, or supplement the
same where appropriate. See id. at 618, 103 S. Ct. at 13 91. It
was the propriety of doing the same that the Court was dealing
with in Arizona, a wholly different set of circumstances than
those before us. See id. The Court merely touched on the
general rules of preclusion, noting that while they "are not
strictly applicable, the principles upon which these rules are
founded should inform our decision." Id. at 619, 103 S. Ct at
1391.
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1065 (citing Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981);
Moitie. 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424).
1f2 8 In Piacitelli, the plaintiff commenced action against
Southern Utah State College (SUSC) alleging that its failure to
renew his employment contract was a dismissal for cause and
violated his rights under SUSC personnel policies. See id. at
1064. SUSC argued that the plaintiff's contract was on a yearto-year basis and thus expired on its own terms. See id. The
trial court held that the plaintiff was not on a year-to-year
contract and thus the procedures in the policy governed. See id,
at 1065. The Utah Supreme Court noted that because the order of
the trial court was not appealed it was binding upon the parties.
See id. Thus, the court treated the plaintiff as an employee
with permanent status who was entitled to the procedures set
forth in the SUSC policy. See id.
i[29 We are persuaded by the reasoning of Moitie and similar
cases. In a situation where one party in cases litigating the
same legal issue chooses not to pursue an appeal, that party may
not benefit from the change of law exception to res judicata
where had that party chosen to appeal the change of law would
have been obtained. Thus, we conclude the district court was
correct in dismissing this case as it was barred under the
doctrine of res judicata.4

udith M. Billings, Judge

H3 0 WE CONCUR;

>amela "T. Greenwood,
P r e si.dirng v NJudge

Davis,

4. Because we agree with the trial court that the Collins' suit
is barred on the grounds of res judicata we do not reach the
other issues raised on appeal.
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